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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we are called upon to decide whether a 
federal cause of action should be implied to permit a 
plaintiff to sue an employee of the Internal Revenue Service 
("IRS") for damages resulting from a constitutional violation 
claimed to have occurred in connection with the 
assessment of a tax liability.1 We will affirm the order of the 
District Court dismissing Shreiber's complaint for failure to 
state a claim. In so doing, we join a number of other courts 
of appeals holding that a damages remedy should not be 
inferred against an IRS agent pursuant to Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for 
alleged constitutional violations, because Congress has 
created an extensive scheme providing remedies to a 
plaintiff complaining of the conduct of government officials 
in connection with tax assessments and collections. 
 
In 1995 and 1996, IRS agent Mastrogiovanni conducted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have previously affirmed, without precedential effect, at least 
three 
district court rulings which have explained that a Bivens remedy should 
not be inferred for allegations of unconstitutional actions by IRS agents. 
See Barnard v. Pavlish, No. 97-CV-0236, 1998 WL 247768, at *8-9 (M.D. 
Pa. Mar. 30, 1998), aff 'd, 187 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 1999) (table) 
(unpublished) (per curiam); Upper v. United States Gov't, No. 93-3596 
(JHR), 1994 WL 660738, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 1994), aff 'd, 74 F.3d 
1229 (3d Cir. 1995) (table) (judgment order); Schiff v. Balas, Civ. A. No. 
90-2007, 1991 WL 330204, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 1991), aff 'd, 961 
F.2d 1568 (3d Cir. 1992) (table) (judgment order). We noted, but did not 
decide, a similar issue in Lojeski v. Boandl, 788 F.2d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
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an audit of the federal income tax liabilities of Shreiber and 
his wife for the 1991, 1992 and 1993 tax years. During the 
investigation, Shreiber spoke with Mastrogiovanni on 
several occasions and became familiar with 
 
Mastrogiovanni's voice. Shreiber alleges that on August 11, 
1995, Mastrogiovanni left a voice mail message at his place 
of business stating in part: "Hey you Jew bastard piece of 
shit. This is White Trash, I am going to get you." Thereafter, 
when the audit was completed, the IRS sent a "30-day 
letter" to the Shreibers, dated May 31, 1996, proposing 
large increases in their tax liabilities for the years 1991, 
1992 and 1993. The letter was prepared by J. J. Jennings, 
District Director, on the basis of Mastrogiovanni's 
recommendation. 
 
Shreiber filed a timely protest of the adjustment with the 
IRS, and proceeded to contest it through administrative 
channels. It appears that he reached a tentative settlement 
with the IRS in June of 1999, in which the IRS agreed to 
reduce the amount of deductions it would deny and agreed 
to an adjusted amount due. 
 
On May 29, 1998, while the administrative appeal was 
pending, Shreiber filed a civil rights action against 
Mastrogiovanni and the IRS. Shreiber's complaint alleges 
that he was "denied his constitutional right to a fair hearing 
due to the religious discrimination of the IRS agent," 
evidenced by the voice mail message, and "deprived of 
property without due process of law, in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights." In his appellate briefs, Shreiber 
extends his complaint to encompass an equal protection 
violation based on religion and grounded in the Fifth 
Amendment. He requests damages compensating him for 
his attorney's fees and mental anguish as well as punitive 
damages. The government filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which the District Court actually treated as a 
motion to dismiss. 
 
The District Court dismissed the complaint on two 
grounds. First, the District Court determined that Shreiber 
could not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
The District Court explained that Shreiber had conceded 
that 26 U.S.C. S 7433 was limited to redressing violations of 
the Internal Revenue Code and, thus, did not provide him 
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with a cause of action. The Court then considered whether 
a Bivens remedy should be inferred. Reviewing the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bivens, and its progeny, including 
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), the Court 
concluded that a cause of action should not be inferred 
because Congress had enacted 26 U.S.C. S 7433 and had 
provided a complex structure permitting the challenge of 
tax assessments through other means. The Court also 
concluded that even if a cause of action should be inferred, 
the claim should be dismissed as premature because it 
would not accrue until it was determined that the 
assessment had, in fact, been incorrect.2  
 
Shreiber contends that we should infer a cause of action 
under Bivens precisely because Congress did not provide 
one when it enacted 26 U.S.C. S 7433, and because, 
without a federal damages action, he will be without a 
meaningful remedy in the form of compensatory and 
punitive damages and unconstitutional behavior will not be 
deterred. At oral argument, Shreiber emphasized that his 
case should be distinguished from Schweiker and the other 
tax cases resolved in the government's favor by other courts 
because he is contending that his constitutional rights were 
violated on the basis of religious animus. 
 
An understanding of the applicable statutes and their 
history is important to understanding this appeal. In 1988, 
as part of the "Taxpayer Bill of Rights," Congress enacted 
26 U.S.C. S 7433, providing for a federal cause of action 
against an officer or employee of the IRS for actions in 
violation of the Internal Revenue Code or regulations "in 
connection with any collection of Federal tax." 26 U.S.C. 
S 7433(a).3 As enacted,S 7433(a) is the "exclusive remedy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The government does not rely upon this ground of dismissal on 
appeal. The government does argue that Shreiber failed to allege a 
cognizable constitutional violation, and that Mastrogiovanni is entitled 
to 
qualified immunity. In light of our disposition, we need not discuss these 
points. 
 
3. The statute currently states in full: 
 
       (a) In general. If, in connection with any collection of Federal 
tax 
       with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or employee of the Internal 
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for recovering damages resulting from such actions." Id. A 
proposed draft of the provision contained broader language. 
The draft permitted civil actions "in connection with any 
determination or collection of federal tax" and in violation of 
"any provisions of federal law." S. 2223, 100th Cong., 2d 
Sess. S 123 (1988) (emphasis added). The Conference 
Report regarding S 7433 discusses two modifications from 
the Senate draft that are relevant to the issue before us. 
The Report explains that the final version was: 
 
       limited to reckless or intentional disregard in 
       connection with the collection of tax. An action under 
       this provision may not be based on alleged reckless or 
       intentional disregard in connection with the 
       determination of tax. . . . [T]he provision is limited to 
       reckless or intentional disregard of the Internal 
       Revenue Code and the regulations thereunder. An 
       action may not be brought under this provision based 
       on an alleged violation of a Federal law other than the 
       Internal Revenue Code or a regulation promulgated 
       thereunder. 
 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-1104, at 229 (1988), reprinted in 
1988-3 C.B. 473-479;4 see also Miller v. United States, 66 
F.3d 220, 222-23 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the legislative 
history of S 7433 and finding that it does not permit actions 
for the incorrect determinations of tax liability); Shaw v. 
United States, 20 F.3d 182, 184 (5th Cir. 1994). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of 
       negligence, disregards any provision of this title, or any 
regulation 
       promulgated under this title, such taxpayer may bring a civil 
action 
       for damages against the United States in a district court of the 
       United States. Except as provided in section 7432, such civil 
action 
       shall be the exclusive remedy for recovering damages resulting from 
       such actions. 
 
26 U.S.C. S 7433(a). 
 
4. Since its enactment in 1988, Congress has amended S 7433. For 
instance, in 1998, Congress amended the provision to permit suits based 
upon allegations of negligence in the collection of taxes. See Pub. L. No. 
105-206, Sec. 3102(a), (c). 
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Even though S 7433 was narrowed in scope during the 
drafting process, Congress has provided other methods by 
which a taxpayer can challenge an assessment. See 26 
C.F.R. S 601.103(c) (explaining options available to a 
taxpayer). A taxpayer may pursue an internal appeal with 
the IRS, see 26 C.F.R. S 106, sue for a refund in federal 
court, see 28 U.S.C. S 1346(a)(1), 26 U.S.C. SS 6511, 7422, 
or appeal the assessment to the Tax Court, see  26 U.S.C. 
SS 6213, 6214. Attorney's fees may be recovered in certain 
circumstances when the taxpayer is successful. See 26 
U.S.C. S 7430. As noted, Shreiber utilized the 
administrative appeals process. 
 
In determining whether Shreiber's claim can be asserted 
against Mastrogiovanni in a civil rights action, we must 
consult the relevant precedent beginning with the seminal 
case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents. In 
Bivens, the Supreme Court held that an individual 
complaining of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal 
officers acting under color of their authority may bring a 
suit for money damages against the officers in federal court. 
See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. In so holding, the Court noted 
in dicta that "[t]he present case involves no special factors 
counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress," and found "no explicit congressional declaration 
that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the 
Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from 
the agents, but must instead be remitted to another 
remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress." Id. at 
396-97. 
 
Following Bivens, the Supreme Court has considered the 
availability of damages remedies under Bivens  in a number 
of factual settings, and addressed the meaning of"special 
factors counseling hesitation."5 The Court's decision in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 
296, 304 (1983) (finding that "the unique disciplinary structure of the 
Military Establishment and Congress' activity in thefield constitute 
`special factors' which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide 
enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior 
officers"); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-84 (1987) (holding 
that Chappell v. Wallace extends to deny Bivens actions "for injuries that 
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Schweiker is particularly relevant to our discussion here. In 
Schweiker, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
damages remedy should be implied under Bivens  for alleged 
due process violations in connection with the denial of 
Social Security benefits. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 420. 
The plaintiffs in Schweiker were three recipients of Social 
Security benefits who had been dropped from the rolls after 
the defendants adopted policies that the plaintiffs alleged 
violated their due process rights. Each plaintiff had either 
successfully appealed the determination or applied for 
reinstatement, and had either received full retroactive 
benefits or had an application for benefits pending. Each 
plaintiff, then, sued for additional damages not available 
through the congressionally provided measures. 
 
The Supreme Court held that no Bivens remedy should 
be implied. Reviewing the teachings of applicable precedent, 
the Court reaffirmed that the absence of statutory relief for 
a constitutional violation does not necessarily mean that 
courts should create a damages remedy against the officer 
responsible for the violation. See id. at 421-22. The Court 
also referenced the importance of considering Congress's 
activities in the area in question even if the remedies 
provided did not afford complete relief. See id.  at 423-24 
(citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983)). The Court 
explained: 
 
       In sum, the concept of "special factors counseling 
       hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
       Congress" has proved to include an appropriate judicial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
`arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [military] 
service' "); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983) (refusing to create a 
non-statutory damages remedy for a federal employee whose First 
Amendment right to free speech was violated by a superior); Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (permitting a suit for damages directly 
under the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979) (implying 
a damages remedy directly under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment against a United States Congressman who allegedly fired the 
plaintiff because of her sex); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 474 
(1994) (refusing to imply a Bivens remedy directly against a federal 
agency). 
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       deference to indications that congressional inaction 
       has not been inadvertent. When the design of a 
       Government program suggests that Congress has 
       provided what it considers adequate remedial 
       mechanisms for constitutional violations that may 
       occur in the course of its administration, we have not 
       created additional Bivens remedies. 
 
Id. at 423. 
 
Proceeding to discuss the merits of the appeal, the Court 
noted that the remedial structure did not provide the 
plaintiffs with the "complete relief " that would be available 
by way of a Bivens suit, see id. at 424-25, 426-27, but 
confirmed that this did not require the creation of a Bivens 
remedy, see id. at 424-25 (discussing Bush v. Lucas). The 
Court explained that Congress "ha[d] not failed to provide 
meaningful safeguards or remedies," and deferred to 
Congress's competence at balancing issues of governmental 
efficiency and individual rights. See id. at 425, 429. The 
Court also rejected the argument that a Bivens  action 
should be inferred in order to provide separate remedies for 
those individuals who lost their benefits because of a 
constitutional violation rather than a non-constitutional 
violation. See id. at 426-27. 
 
Applying these considerations to the case at hand, we 
agree with the District Court that a Bivens action should 
not be inferred to permit suits against IRS agents accused 
of violating a taxpayer's constitutional rights in the course 
of making a tax assessment. Rather than supporting 
Shreiber's argument, the legislative history of 26 U.S.C. 
S 7433(a) indicates that Congress did not inadvertently fail 
to codify a cause of action for assessment conduct; rather, 
Congress deleted "determinations" -- which would have 
included assessments -- in passing the statutory provision. 
Moreover, Congress modified what was in draft form a 
remedy for violations of "federal law" and enacted instead a 
remedy for violations only of the IRS code and regulations. 
Congress chose to provide certain remedies, and not others, 
as part of the complex statutory scheme which regulates 
the relationship between the IRS and taxpayers. We will not 
create a remedy where Congress has chosen not to. 
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Although Shreiber correctly argues that without a Bivens 
action he cannot recover completely, Schweiker  explains 
that where Congress has provided meaningful remedies we 
should exercise extreme caution in creating additional 
relief. As with the administration of welfare benefits, the 
organization of the tax system, and the balancing of 
governmental efficiency and individual rights, is best left to 
Congress. See id. at 429 ("Whether or not we believe that 
its response was the best response, Congress is the body 
charged with making the inevitable compromises required 
in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits 
program."). 
 
We also believe Shreiber's deterrence argument is 
similarly misplaced. Although deterrence is one of the aims 
of a Bivens action, see FDIC v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 485 
(1995) (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980)), we, 
again, should defer to Congress in this regard. Also, this 
case is distinguishable from Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632 
(7th Cir. 1997), relied upon by Shreiber for his argument 
regarding deterrence. In Bagola, the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit permitted a prison inmate to bring a 
Bivens action complaining of a violation of his Eighth 
Amendment rights based on deliberate indifference to his 
safety in a prison factory. Notwithstanding the existence of 
the remedy provided by 18 U.S.C. S 4126 and the teachings 
of Schweiker and Bush v. Lucas, the Court found that the 
limited nature of the remedy and the absence of deterrent 
effect suggested that Congress had not intended the 
statutory remedy to preclude a Bivens action. See id. at 
642-45.6 The Court's analysis was guided by the 
consideration of deterrence in Carlson v. Green , 446 U.S. 
14, 19 (1980), in which the Supreme Court permitted a 
Bivens action under the Eighth Amendment despite the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Under the applicable statute and regulations, Bagola received 
compensation for his lost wages. See id. at 634. In addition, within 
forty- 
five days of his release from prison, he could apply for compensation for 
his injury in a no-fault proceeding. See id. at 634, 634 n.2. The Seventh 
Circuit found the remedy to be lacking in deterrent value because of the 
potentially long delay and the possibility that the defendants' alleged 
conduct would not be relevant to the claim evaluation process. See id. at 
644. 
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remedy provided by the Federal Tort Claims Act, as well as 
the particular context of prisoner litigation. See id. at 638- 
40, 642-45. Due to the differences in the remedial scheme 
as well as the legislative backdrop of the statute we are 
examining, Bagola does not inform our analysis. 
 
We note that our holding in this case is supported by the 
decisions of a number of other Courts of Appeals that have 
concluded that a Bivens action should not be inferred 
against IRS agents. See Fishburn v. Brown, 125 F.3d 979, 
982-83 (6th Cir. 1997) (refusing to permit a Bivens action 
against IRS agents for seizure of property allegedly in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment); National Commodity & 
Barter Assoc. v. Archer, 31 F.3d 1521, 1532 (10th Cir. 
1994) (finding no Bivens action for jeopardy assessments 
allegedly in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments); 
Vennes v. Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents , 26 F.3d 
1448, 1453-54 (8th Cir. 1994) (denying a Bivens  action 
alleging numerous constitutional violations leading to illegal 
tax assessments and collections); McMillen v. United States, 
960 F.2d 187, 190-91 (1st Cir. 1991) (dicta) (per curiam) 
(finding it unlikely that a Bivens action would exist to 
dispute tax liability or demand the lifting of a lien); Wages 
v. United States, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(dicta) (finding that it would be futile for the plaintiff to 
amend her pleadings in part because a Bivens action would 
not lie for the constitutionally impermissible collection of 
taxes); Cameron v. IRS, 773 F.2d 126, 129-30 (7th Cir. 
1985) (considering the issue before S 7433). Although none 
of these cases explicitly consider the drafting of 26 U.S.C. 
S 7433 in their analysis, and some involve collection actions 
rather than tax determinations, many rely explicitly upon 
Schweiker to conclude that the Bivens action against IRS 
employees is foreclosed by the existence of comprehensive 
statutory remedies. See Fishburn, 125 F.3d at 982; National 
Commodity & Barter Assoc., 31 F.3d at 1532; Vennes, 26 
F.3d at 1453; McMillen, 960 F.2d at 190-91. 
 
Shreiber also argues that this case should be 
distinguished from Schweiker, and the other decisions cited 
above, because it involves religious animus. However, 
Shreiber's pleading complains essentially of a denial of a 
fair hearing which resulted in the wrongful assessment of 
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his tax, and of the proximate effects of the IRS agent's 
actions. He does not contend that his right to religious 
freedom was implicated; rather, he cites the evidence of 
religious animus in support of his allegations that he was 
denied his Fifth Amendment right to due process and equal 
protection.7 As he explained during oral argument, he 
would, however, have us hold that the type of 
unconstitutional act that leads to the incorrect assessment 
can alter the analysis of whether a Bivens action should be 
inferred. We do not find this argument convincing. Our 
focus at this time is not on the nature of the constitutional 
violation that led to the allegedly incorrect assessment -- 
which the plaintiff must prove on the merits and we 
assume at this time -- but whether it is appropriate to 
create a damages action to remedy the wrong in light of 
what Congress has done. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 427; 
Bush, 462 U.S. at 381 (considering "what legal remedies are 
available to him"); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 245 
(separating the potential violation of the constitutional right 
from the question "whether a damages remedy is an 
appropriate form of relief "). The complaint focuses on 
assessment activities asserted to be in violation of 
Shreiber's civil rights, and, regardless of the type of illegal 
motivation or the particulars of the violation, Congress has 
established a statutory scheme providing remedies for 
incorrect assessments. Our analysis focusing on the 
remedy, rather than the wrong, is consistent with the 
analysis used by the Supreme Court in Bush v. Lucas and 
endorsed in Schweiker, and also applied by the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in National Commodity & 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that portions of Shreiber's complaint allege injuries caused in 
part by the comments left on his voice mail. However, Shreiber candidly 
states in his brief that he "does not contend that the telephone message 
left by the IRS agent Mastrogiovanni was the violation of Appellant's 
constitutional rights, but instead is evidence of the agent's religious 
discrimination against Appellant." Appellant's Br. at 8. Even if Shreiber 
had alleged the comments as a separate cause of action, the comments 
would not necessarily establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g., 
Emmons v. Mclaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
a police officer's threat did not constitute a constitutional violation 
actionable under 42 U.S.C. S 1983); see also McMillen, 960 F.2d at 190; 
Cameron, 773 F.2d at 128-29. 
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Barter Association v. Archer. However, our focus on the 
remedy at this stage should not be construed as condoning 
the alleged wrong. 
 
Bush v. Lucas is particularly relevant to this aspect of 
Shreiber's argument. In Bush, the Supreme Court held that 
a Bivens action should not be inferred to permit federal 
employees to sue their supervisors for alleged violations of 
their First Amendment rights "[b]ecause such claims arise 
out of an employment relationship that is governed by 
comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions 
giving meaningful remedies against the United States." 
Bush, 462 U.S. at 368. Although the Court presumed that 
the plaintiff 's First Amendment rights had been violated, 
see id. at 372, the Court explained: "The ultimate question 
on the merits in this case may appropriately be 
characterized as one of `federal personnel policy.' When a 
federal civil servant is the victim of a retaliatory demotion 
or discharge because he has exercised his First Amendment 
rights, what legal remedies are available to him?" Id. at 
380-81. 
 
In Schweiker, the plaintiffs argued that a Bivens action 
should be inferred to provide them with additional remedies 
because they had been denied benefits for constitutional 
reasons. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 427. The Court, 
however, explained that Bush "drew no distinction between 
compensation for a `constitutional wrong' and the 
restoration of statutory rights that had been 
unconstitutionally taken away," and concluded that "[i]n 
light of the comprehensive statutory schemes involved [in 
Schweiker and Bush], the harm resulting from the alleged 
constitutional violation can in neither case be separated 
from the harm resulting from the denial of the statutory 
right." Id. at 427-28. Further, in a case dealing with a suit 
against IRS agents alleging wrongful "jeopardy" 
assessments, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
found no distinction between a Bivens action based on 
violations of the plaintiff 's First or Fourth Amendment 
rights, as compared to one based on alleged violations of 
the plaintiff 's due process rights under the Fifth 
Amendment. See National Commodity & Barter Assoc., 31 
F.3d at 1532. The Court found that a Bivens action should 
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not be inferred for any of the claims because the remedies 
for the wrongful jeopardy assessment were afforded by 
statute. See id. ("This reasoning [denying a Bivens action 
for a violation of the Fifth Amendment] is equally applicable 
to the claim grounded on allegations of wrongful jeopardy 
assessments here under the First and Fourth Amendments. 
In light of the remedies afforded elsewhere, we decline to 
recognize a First or Fourth Amendment Bivens remedy 
based on the allegations of wrongful jeopardy assessments 
made by the instant complaint . . . ."). 
 
In sum, Shreiber asks us to infer a federal damages 
remedy under Bivens for violation of his Fifth Amendment 
protections of due process and equal protection by an IRS 
agent charged with auditing his tax returns. We decline to 
do so because we believe that Congress's efforts to govern 
the relationship between the taxpayer and the taxman 
indicate that Congress has provided what it considers to be 
adequate remedial mechanisms for wrongs that may occur 
in the course of this relationship. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. 
at 424. The fact that Shreiber's complaint seeks damages 
not otherwise provided for in the legislative scheme and 
alleges wrongful religious animus does not alter our 
analysis. 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                13 
